This article departs from the puzzling observation that of the five littoral arctic states the Danish realm has been the most consistent backer in China's quest to gain observer status in the Arctic Council. Small states are generally assumed to adapt to changes in the international system such as spatial re-configurations and alterations in the distribution of capabilities. Yet Denmark's enabling role in relation to China seems to contravene that assumption. Why would a small state invite one of the world's leading powers to enter its regional domain while its principle allies and regional partners -including USA and Canada -were still indecisive or outright hesitant? This article explores three possible explanations for the Danish support for China: 1) a domestic politics explanatio n featuring strategic use of discourse to entice Chinese investments in Arctic minera l extraction. 2) a securitisation explanation suggesting that unease with growing Canadian securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted courting China as a balancing act. 3) a foreign policy identity explanation focussing on the normative desire to enmeshment China into a liberal Arctic order.
Introduction
In 2009 China applied to upgrade its ad hoc observer status (held since 2007) to regular observer state in the Arctic Council. This was not granted at the time, but in late 2011
China renewed its bit -as a 'near arctic state' -for a formal position in the Arctic governance structure. Somewhat surprisingly the Arctic Council accommodated China's wishes at their Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna in mid-May 2013 (for further discussion Willis & Depledge, 2015, p. 399-401) . The upgrading of China's status in the Arctic Council is of limited formal importance as it merely consolidates an already wellestablished practice of China being invited to Council ministerial and working group meetings. Yet China's wish for, and granting of, observer status is of great symbolic significance. This is evident by the active participation of high-level Chinese delegatio ns in Council activities and in statements in and outside the Council urging the upgrading of its membership. The official state visits prior to China's most recent application by the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Iceland and Sweden and by President Hu Jintao to Denmark -the first state visit by a Chinese President in the country's history -also all bear witness to the importance attached to the issue by China (see also Jacobson & Lee, 2013) . At the same time, an application on behalf of the European Union (EU), which had otherwise followed a comparable trajectory to that of China's, was rejected: A rejection that -due to a turn of events -is not causally reversed given the strained relationship between the EU and Russia following the situation at the Crimea. Together this underline that decisions on allowing access to Artic governance is not taken lightly and institutional choices made in an emerging regional governance structure may well have lasting implications for power relations and political outcomes.
This article departs from the puzzling observation that of the five littoral arctic states the Danish realm has been the most consistent backer in China's quest to gain observer 4 status in the Arctic Council. Why did Copenhagen deem it to be in its interest to proactively promote China's stake in Arctic affairs? While minor and middle powers do at times exhibit diplomatic entrepreneurship, small states are generally assumed to adapt to changes in the international system such as spatial re-configurations and alterations in the distribution of capabilities (see Archer et al., 2014 ). Yet Denmark's enabling role in relation to China's quest for observer status in the Arctic Council seem to contravene that assumption. This begs the question: Why would a small state invite one of the world's leading powers to enter its regional domain as the latter is no longer sheltered by a virtually inaccessible ice cap? Why would it do so while its principle allies and regional partners were still indecisive or outright hesitant?
The article is organised as follows: the second section presents and theoretica lly grounds three explanations emphasising respectively: 1) a domestic politics explanatio n featuring strategic use of discourse to entice Chinese investments in Arctic minera l extraction. 2) a securitisation explanation suggesting that unease with growing Canadian securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted courting China as a balancing act. 3) a foreign policy identity explanation focussing on the normative desire to enmeshment China into a liberal Arctic order. The sections three, four and five investigating in turn the explanations empirically follow this. The sixth and final section concludes on the reasons for the unlikely Danish advocacy for China's inclusion in arctic governance. But first we shall explore the immediate implications of China's bid for the Danish Realm.
China's Arctic Bid and the Danish Realm
Popular explanations for Denmark's support for China's Arctic Council bid have emphasised material gains as reflected in the coverage of major dailies (see Jørgenssen, 5 2011; Lü, 2012; Wamsler, 2012) . China has won diplomatic favours through financial aid or investment in a number of instances around the globe. The recipients of aid or investment and grantors of favours have typically been economically precarious or vulnerable developing countries. By contrast Danish nominal GDP per capita is on par with that of Canada and USA, the balance of trade and the current account exhibit consistent and healthy surpluses, unemployment is modest, public debt manageable and top graded by S&P, Fitch and Moody's with stable outlook (Danmarks Statistik, 2017) . From the perspective of Greenland the potential rewards, however, may be significant. Not least in view of its substantial unexploited mineral riches. China has a proven track record in mineral extraction at sites considered inaccessible or otherwise risky and has leveraged various instruments such as development assistance to ensure required infrastructure roll-out to handle logistical challenges and ensure provision of utilities in remote locations.
The Danish realm includes Denmark, the North Atlantic Faroe Islands and Greenland. The two dominions have been granted Self-government in all issues save foreign and security policy. The distribution of the expected income from future resource extraction was negotiated between the Danish and Greenlandic governments and expressed in the agreement on Self-government made in 2009. On an annual basis, the first approximately US$13m (DKK75m) goes to Greenland; any income above this is divided equally between the two governments, where the Danish share takes the form of a reduction of the yearly block grant to Greenland. This is currently approximate ly US$600m (approx. DKK 3.5 billion). Should the block grant be reduced to 0 then the agreement is to be re-negotiated (Law about Greenlandic Self-government, 2009).
While the Danish and Greenlandic governments both hold out the prospect of gains from the agreement, it is clear that the expected income is of much more significance for the Greenlandic economy (see also Keil, 2013) . The Greenlandic government must be expected to have a strong preference for exploiting this opportunity and attract international partners for this purpose. Yet the institutional constraints in having Copenhagen in charge of foreign and security policy means Greenland need to exert pressure on the Danish government in order to pursuit its interests' vis-á-vis China.
How can we explain the Danish advocacy for China's inclusion in Arctic

Governance?
Our approach to exploring the Danish advocacy for China's inclusion in arctic governance follows Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009) argument in favour of methodological pragmatism and analytical eclecticism when dealing with complex and novel research questions. The aim of our pragmatic approach is to enable the generation of systematic analytical insight into reasons for the Danish advocacy for China's inclus io n in arctic governance. Our analytical eclectic version of pragmatism developed below will thus draw on a range of research traditions from comparative politics and Internatio na l relations. International relation theory has traditionally separated the international system from domestic politics; the former being the object of analysis (Wendt, 1999 , chapter 1).
However, analysing the case at hand it is especially important to include a focus on domestic politics. That is, a focus on the special nature of the Danish realm including in principle two separate governments with potentially very different geopolitical interests.
The three different explanations we engage with are not necessarily competing, but nonetheless have their origin in different strands of literature. Using discursive institutionalism, the first explanation reflects popular depictions which have dominated press coverage of the issue in Denmark. The second explanation leans on Regiona l Security Complex theory which is uniquely positioned to zoom in on constitutive dynamics of a region emerging from the receding icecap while enticing 'penetrating external powers'. Finally, small state literature and constructivist foreign policy analysis emphasise small states reliance on, and enthusiasm for multilateral, governance mechanisms while also appreciating that the entailed normative package may impact behaviour to an extent that challenge what a more confined rationalist calculus would stipulate as being in a given small states 'national interest'. Hence the puzzling observation that Denmark seemingly failed to align its position with more cautious key allies may be accounted for by 'normative capture'.
The domestic politics explanation
The domestic politics explanation puts a spotlight on the relation between Denmark and Greenland within the Danish realm. Greenlandic political pressure can here be viewed as a potential determinant of Danish Arctic policy. This perspective takes its cue from the literature on discursive institutionalism (Lynggaard, 2012; Schmidt, 2008) . The discursive institutional perspective offers the conceptual means to understand how the Greenlandic government may exercise pressure on the Danish government, even under the condition of the hierarchical relationship between the Danish and Greenland ic government on foreign policy issues.
Discursive institutional theory accentuates that actors are guided by discourse setting out a 'space of possibility' for viable political activity. Political actors most often operate without much further reflection according to a set of internalised discourses. However, sometimes actors may also use discourses strategically to bring about or, indeed, hinder certain policy goals (Lynggaard, 2013) . To understand the discourses guiding the relationship between central Danish and Greenlandic governments, we need to look to the discursive constitution of the Danish realm. It has been suggested that the Danish realm discourse is characterised by two apparent paradoxes: (i) that the end goal of the Realm is its own dissolution and (ii) that it is made up by equal partners, even though it is clearly a hierarchical relation, historically and present (Gad, 2008) . Our central claim is here that the paradoxical nature of the Danish realm discourse is especially fit for strategic use: first the realm paradoxes work so as to explicate the discourse for the involved actors; second, it allows for, if not multiple, then a range of meanings to be attached to the political relationships in the Danish realm. Both are conditions conducive for Greenlandic strategic use of discourse to exert pressure on the Danish government to support further involvement of China in Arctic governance.
The securitisation explanation
The second explanation utilizes regional security complex (RSC) theory and suggests Denmark has a stated intention of preventing a militarisation of the Arctic. This is hardly surprising given that the country is a minor power in a region otherwise populated by major and great powers. Yet as a small power, Denmark's possibility for decisive ly influencing the level of Arctic militarisation is limited. In this context prudent small state strategists need to plan for eventual intensified security rivalry and seek to expand its options in case demilitarization fails to carry the day.
RSC theory including the concept of 'Securitisation' (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Waever, 1995) analyse security as a speech act, where the issue is not if threats are objectively present, but rather how a certain issue (troop movements, migration, or environmental degradation) can be socially constructed as a threat. The approach seeks to bridge constructivist and realist inspired IR and accordingly also takes material factors into account. The theory acknowledges neorealist traits such as polarity, balancing and the need for great powers to possess certain capabilities. But in addition emphasise that great powers are defined by their behaviour. In security terms regions can be placed on a continuum on the basis of the prevalent patterns of interaction ranging from a traditio na l realist logic to a post-modern logic ((Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 32, p. 75) . While regionally focussed extra-regional actors may be enticed to enter a specific RSC:
The standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance-of power, and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region: to this pattern can then be added the effects of penetrating external powers. (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 47) RSC theory crucially links material factors with discursive practices by stipulating that e.g. asymmetric capability distributions, the general operating mode of a given RSC, which could include involvement by extra-regional penetrating powers, impact if and how securitization unfold (Buzan & Waever, 2003, p. 86-87) . What we propose is admittedly an elaborate string of arguments. The claim is that unease with growing Canadian securitisation of Arctic issues has prompted Denmark to court China as a balancing act.
But in order for securitization to take hold, Denmark must respond in kind. Our investigation will therefore initially establish if rhetoric on Arctic issues in Ottawa and Copenhagen exhibit signs of securitization. Only if this can be established shall we endeavour to ascertain if Sino-Danish collusion may be designated an alliance.
Foreign Policy Identity and normative agenda's
Our third explanation combines traditional 'small state' preference for multilateralisa tio n with the Foreign Policy Identity literature which emanates from constructivism. Identity can broadly be defined as "images of individuality and distinctiveness ('selfhood') held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant 'others'" (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 59) . In its discursive connotation, identity is concerned with the justification of foreign policy rather than its causation (Hansen, 2002, p. 8) . As such it is considered the deepest discursive layer providing the foundatio n of argumentative legitimations of foreign policy. Stahl et. al. (2004, p. 426-27 ) depicts a post-World War II Danish foreign policy identity which breaks with its previous path of isolationism and neutrality only to find itself captured between two co-existing discourses exposing a 'preference for Nordic cooperation' and 'an openness to multilateral collaboration'. The Arctic Council offers an ideal acid test for this diagnosis since it promise a venue of multilateral collaborating which can be grounded in Nordic cooperation.
As a founding member of the UN and all major 'Western' regimes, Denmark's consistent aspiration to strengthen the formalisation and institutionalisation of international relations is well documented (Branner & Kelstrup, 2000; Schouenborg, 2012) . This behaviour is consistent with small state theory (Katzenstein, 1985; Toje, 2010) and can be seen to reflect an example of the 'creative agency' of 'Small State Diplomacy' (Bishop, 2012, p. 950-51) . In this vein, Copenhagen deems Chinese engagement in the Arctic inevitable and thus seeks to enmesh the country in a budding regional governance structure. Elevating China to a stakeholder may ensure complia nce from state backed mining groups vis-a-vis environmental and labour standards.
Small state behaviour typically conforms to either patterns of adaptation or activis m.
With the demise of the Soviet threat and the end of bipolarity, Denmark replaced adaptation with activism (Pedersen, 2012, p. 333) . Danish foreign policy activism has been associated with 'internationalism' and 'multilateralism' entailing an increase in Denmark's engagement in international organizations and alliances (Holm, 1997 (Pedersen, 2012, p. 332 
Enlisting China as a balancing act
A militarization of the Arctic is favoured by no one (Heininen, 2010) (Harper, 2008 ).
This observation led to a commitment for 'A Stronger Northern Presence' (Harper, 2008) and in 2010, the Canadian foreign ministry issued its Arctic Foreign Policy Statement, which is subtitled: 'Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's NORTHERN STRATEGY Abroad'. The 29-page document contains three sections the first of which is presented under the headline 'Exercising Sovereignty'. This section sets out three priorities the first of which is resolving border issues. In direct references to relations with the Kingdom of Denmark it is stated:
Our sovereignty over Canadian Arctic lands, including islands, is undisputed-with the single exception of Hans Island, a 1.3-square-kilometre Canadian island which
Denmark claims…Canada controls all maritime navigation in its waters. (Cannon, 2010, p. 6-7) .
Nevertheless, disagreements exist…between Canada and Denmark over a small part of the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea
In parallel to the above, which does lean towards securitization, the document makes several conciliatory statements such as: 'All disagreements are well managed, neither posing defence challenges for Canada nor diminishing Canada's ability to collaborate and cooperate with its Arctic neighbours' (Cannon, 2010, p. Greenland are parting ways (Langhoff, 2012; Wang, 2012) . It essentially makes a case for Greenland remaining in the Realm, which is hardly a surprising point of view for a member of the defence establishment. However, it also reveals a distinct line of thinking which assumes states are power maximizing entities and peace is best served by maintaining a balance of power, much in line with realist dogma. In sum, rhetoric's paving the way for a securitisation of the Arctic can be recorded in Canada. Given geographic and size differences it is hardly surprising that Canadian rhetoric is more blunt and assertive and is more inclined to directly address Denmark.
Denmark, on the other hand, exhibits a more subdued posture and avoids pitting Arctic security issues in a manner suggesting rivalry and neither policy documents, be they official or semi-official, nor political speeches link acts of Arctic securitisation with China's affiliation to the Arctic Council. Moreover, none of the policy makers interviewed for this article pointed to a link between Denmark's support for China's application and balancing concerns -on the contrary several strongly dismissed the idea.
In this light the failure to establish an empirical case for securitisation on the one hand and Denmark's advocacy of China on the other warrant a rejection of the second explanation. Dodds, 2013, p. 121-22; Koivurova & Duyck, 2010, p. 186) . The critique particularly concern Denmark's leading role in convening the secluded purely intergovernmental ad hoc group designated the Arctic Five.
Making China a responsible stakeholder in Arctic governance
In late May 2008 the circumpolar states comprising Canada, United States, Russia, Norway and Denmark gathered at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Western Greenland.
Co-hosts, Denmark's Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller and Greenlandic Prime Minister
Hans Enoksen had prepared a document, which after minor alterations was adopted as the Ilulissat Declaration (Petersen, 2009) A prominent observer of Danish Arctic policies, Martin Breum, suggests that Denmark's eagerness to attach China to the Council is rooted in the fear that states outside of the region will use the UN to gain influence on Arctic governance (Breum, 2011, p. 58 ). Yet in one of the interviews conducted by the authors it was stated that only NGO's and social scientists had advocated a deeper UN involvement whereas this was not an issue among the present or prospective permanently attached states (interview with Danish civil servant, 13 February 2013). However, others suggested that concerns regarding the establishment of alternative fora including a special UN arrangement had been instrumental in changing the US attitude on the issue, which eventually enabled China to be admitted as an observer at the May 2013 Kiruna meeting (interview with Kuupik Kleist, 29 May 2013) .
In sum, the explanation conforms neatly to Denmark's self-perceived diplomatic heritage, its small state identity and domestic political culture in general. While Denmark's role in setting up the Arctic Five on the surface suggest the country has no ingrained preference for multilateral governance and some observations offered by senior officials reveals limited confidence in the Arctic Council's potential as a potent future regional governance body which may entangle China into an 'Arctic Order', both the Arctic Five initiative and statements made by all interviewed officials suggest the country in essence seek to embed intergovernmental liaisons in multilateral frameworks when possible.
Conclusions: Assessing the relative strength of three explanations
Three possible explanations were offered to make sense of Denmark's proactive stance in aiding a rising power gaining a political foothold in a region where Copenhagen is in a vulnerable position as the receding icecap opens up for rivalry over resource access, shipping lanes and territory. It has proved difficult to sustain our first proposed explanation claiming that Denmark's forthcoming approach to China's application for an observer seat in the Arctic Council was the result of Greenlandic pressure. Yet the domestic politics perspective has some merits in that it is conducive to the Danish position that appears to be equally backed by the Greenlandic and different Danish governme nts in spite of the fact that Denmark risks estranging itself from its closest allies by adopting this stance.
All interview respondents strongly dismissed the second explanation. This is to be expected, as members of the security policy community are keenly aware of the risks involved in conveying signals containing signs of either national weakness or aggressive pretentions. Yet, Denmark's courting of China in the Arctic realm cannot reasonable be explained with reference to Canada's adoption of highly securitised rhetoric as it is evident from our analysis of key government documents, independent reports and analyses that Denmark refrained from embracing similar semantics.
Our third explanation suggests the Danish stance reflects genuine support for multilateral governance. Methodologically this claim contains some bias as all Danish and Greenlandic interview respondents immediately identified with the position.
However, it is a claim supported by several other interview respondents, independent analyses and it conforms neatly to the country's self-perceived diplomatic heritage, its small state identity and domestic political culture in general. Thus, the Danish strategy fit well into its traditional foreign policy identity suggesting that small states are not just adapting to changes in the international system including spatial re-configurations and alterations in the distribution of capabilities, but may also adopt diplomatic strategies, if not against, then at least in the face of hesitant interest articulations of traditional allies.
These findings call for further exploration of the conditions under which small states may adopt potentially estranging regional governance strategies. This article suggests that alignment of foreign policy identity and strategy is -unsurprisingly -conducive for small states 'going alone'. Yet, arguably it is particularly significant that such strategy is adopted in the context of a less than institutionalised regional governance structure.
Further insight to this is potentially of great importance, especially if we expect that institutional choices made in an emerging regional governance structure may well have lasting -and perhaps sometimes unintended -implications for power relations and political outcomes.
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